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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. A. NIElSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN W. SMITH and J. CAMERON SMITH, E. LIN-
COL~ SJ\DTIL POLLY SMITH, JOHN W. SMITH 
and MA.X GAILEY. Trustees of the SMITH LAND No. 6199 COMPA.NY, and SMITH LA!'l--o COMPANY, a 
corporatio~ 
Defendants and Appellants, 
ALBERT S. WHEEL WRIGHT, Trustee in Bankruptcy 
of John W. Smith, Bankrupt, 
Intervenor and Respondent. 
SMITH LA.ND COMPANY, a corporatio~ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
M. M. JOHNSON, Receiver of Nielson-Burton Com- No. 6198 
pany, formerly a co-partnership composed of A. J. 
Nielson and Charles S. Burton, CHARLES D. 
MOORE and WILSE A. NIELSON, 
Defendants. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
The respondents' brief contains a sketchy statement 
of facts which carefully omits all evidence which is dam-
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
aging to them. No reference is made to the pages of the 
transcript and the Abstract of Record as required by rule 
Ten of the Rules of Practice of this Court. Many of the 
statements are inaccurate and misleading and some find 
no support in the record whatever. Other facts of vital 
importance are not even mentioned. 
The respondents' argument is based upon the as-
sumption of the very thing which they are trying to prove, 
namely: that the findings of fraud are sustained by the 
evidence. After discussing several cases involving con-
veyances to corporations in fraud of creditors, none of 
which are in point on the facts, it is said on page 17, that 
John W. Smith transferred his property to the corpora-
tion; that after the transfer, he continued to live on the 
land he had contracted to buy; that he was heavily in-
debted to his creditors and was being pressed for money 
and that immediately after forming the corporation, the 
charter was forfeited for non-payment of the franchise 
tax. It is then concluded that there was a clear intent to 
hinder, delay and defraud creditors. Admitting for the 
purpose of the argument that all of these statements are 
true, they do not show a fraudulent intent. The courts 
hold that a transaction in which an insolvent debtor con-
veys to a corporation all of his property and receives in 
exchange the stock of the corporation is not a fraudulent 
conveyance unless it is shown that there was an actual 
fraudulent intent. The rule is stated in an extensive note 
on the subject in 85 A. L. R., page 140: 
''Where the only circumstance relied upon as 
furnishing the intent to delay or defraud creditors is 
the fact that the debtor transferred his property to 
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a corporation in consideration of its stock, many 
courts have refused to derlare the transaction fraud-
ulent as having been entered into with intent to de-
lay and defraud creditors, or one without eonsider-
ation. Such tr~msfers are sustained, in the absence 
of an actual intent to delay or defraud creditors, 
which must be deduced fr~rn circumstances other 
than the mere transfer iu consideration of stock.'' 
In the case of Sunderlin Y. Terry, 95 Conn. 713, 112 
Atl642, a debtor conveyed his property to a corporation 
organized by him, received stock for his property, bor-
rowed money and pledged the stock, as security. The 
creditors attacked the conveyance as fraudulent, but the 
court refused to set it aside and after analyzing the evi-
dence said: 
''To organize a personal business into a corpora-
tion is altogether too common to raise any presump-
tion of fraud.'' 
See also: 
Jordan v. Lynch Land Company, 83 Ind. App. 33, 
147 N. E. 318; 
Gardner v. Haines, 19 S. D. 514, 104 N. W. 244; 
Shumaker v. Davidson, 116 Iowa 569, 87 N. W. 
441; 
Plant v. Billings-Drew Company, 127 Mich. 11, 86 
N. W. 399;_ 
Thorpe v. Pennock Mere. Company, 99 Minn. 22, 
180 N. W. 940; 
Persse & B-Paper Works v. Willett, 19 Abb. Pr. 
(N.Y.) 416; 
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Byrnet & H. Dry Goods Company v. Willis Dann 
Company, 23 S. D. 221, 121 N. W. 620, 29 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 589; 
Bristol Bank & T. Company v. Jonesboro, 101 
Tenn. 545, 48 S. W. 228 ; 
Densmore Commission Company v. Shong, 98 
Wis. 380, 74 N. W. 114. 
Throughout the presentation of the facts and the argu-
ment, the respondents seek to give the impression that 
in 1930 when the alleged fraudulent assignment occurred, 
John W. Smith was the owner of valuable land which he 
was seeking to keep away from creditors. The fact is 
that Smith had a contract of purchase upon which he 
had defaulted to the extent of $1208.91 besides interest 
in 1929. He was in default on taxes for three year.s and 
had received several letters threatening cancellation prior 
to 1930. ( Abs. 89, 101.) In the fall of 1930 he was faced 
with a principal payment of $2,000.00 together with inter-
est at Seven percent and he was without money to meet 
the payments. The contract was subject to forfeiture and 
no doubt would have been cancelled but for the timely as-
sistance of J. Cameron Smith. At the time of the assign-
ment, Smith was valiantly seeking to keep the contract of 
purchase in good standing. In October, Smith owed a 
judgment to W. A. Nielson for $54.90 and one to Bertha 
Skeen for $100.00. Another judgment for $1278.92 in 
favor of W. A. Nielson was in 1930 being appealed to the 
Supreme Court and a stay bond was on file. The ·sureties 
qualified before Judge McKinney and Smith expected to 
reverse the case in the Supreme Court. ( Abs. 93.95.) The 
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respondents contend that this srheme of inrorporating 
was not to provide a means of getting family help to 
save a $10,000.00 rontrart but was all devised for the 
purpose of defrauding rreditors of $154.90. The same 
argument was made in the rase of Sunderlin v. Terry, 
supra, the court said : 
'·To organize a personal business into a corpora-
tion is altogether too common to raise any presump-
tion of fraud. Moreo\er, as an ordinary business 
proposition it seems improbable that one having 
$10,000 of property should transfer the "\vhole to es-
cape the payment of the small sum of $150 to $160, 
and retain in the bank half enough cash to pay even 
that, so that $80.00 was the claimed motive for the 
fraudulent transfer.'' 
There is no evidence that the sureties on the appeal 
bond refused to pay or that any effort was made to ex-
haust the security for payment of the judgment for 
$1278.92. The fact of the matter is that W. A. Nielson 
didn't collect the judgment in 1930 because he was looking 
for larger ''game'' than $54.90. He was willing to stand 
by until the contract of purchase was paid out by the 
Smith Land Company with the idea of acquiring all of the 
outstanding accounts and then attempting to get the land. 
The respondents have cited a number of fraud cases, par-
ticularly those using such words as, ''parasitic growth, a 
mass of fungus," etc., but W. A. Nielson and his prede-
cessors did not hesitate to accept payments over a period 
of many years from the ''fungus'' until the contract was 
paid down to where there was an equity. It is argued 
that the corporation was only the alter ego of John W. 
Smith and the fact that the court found that J. Cameron 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Smith had paid $1,000.00 on the contract which was 
credited on his stock account and the fact that he turned 
to the corporation a tractor for which he testified he had 
paid $1500.00 is entirely ignored. J. Cameron Smith was 
not a judgment debtor and there is no evidence in the 
record that he was interested in the slightest in defraud-
ing creditors of John W. Smith and yet the trial court 
made no effort to protect his interests as a stockholder 
or otherwise. 
The court found that J. Cameron Smith paid for his 
stock but that all other shares, except John vV. Smith's, 
were distributed to members of the family wholly with-
out consideration. This finding is contrary to the un-
contradicted testimony of John W. Smith that he was 
indebted to his mother for $1,000.00 cash borrowed from 
her, owed Clarence Smith" Seven Hundred odd dollars," 
owed E. Lincoln Smith $600.00 and also owed money to 
S. M. Smith and Andrew Smith, a son. (Abs. 90.) This 
was a family corporation and all of the members of the 
family were cooperating with an elderly father to en-
able him to keep his ranch. For a similar situation see 
the case of Shumaker vs. Davidson, 116 Iowa 569, 87 
N. W. 441. In that case, the debtor organized a corpora-
tion for the purpose of transferring to it certain land 
which was heavily encumbered. Some of his relatives 
including his wife and brother-in-law conveyed land to 
the corporation and one near relative paid $1200.00 cash 
for his stock. The debtor owed sums to unsecured credi-
tors aggregating about $17,000.00 and the transfer was 
attacked as fraudulent. The court refused to set the 
transaction aside because there was consideration for the 
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transfers, namely: the stock, and there is no evidence of 
fraudulent intent other than the transfer itself. The court 
said: 
"If the corporation were a mere scheme for the 
purpose of concealing covin equity would look be-
hind the curtain to discover the real purpose. It 
is not denied that the other incorporators invested 
money in the scheme and transferred property in 
consideration of stock received. This they would 
not have done had the transaction been as claimed 
by the creditors and their representatives. We are 
asked to say, however, that notwithstanding there is 
no conflict in the evidence regarding the manner and 
method of organization, the whole scheme was a 
fraud and the witness should be disbelieved. This 
we are not prepared to do. "When the facts dis-
closed are as consistent with honesty and good faith 
as with fraud and deceit we must sustain the trans-
action.'' 
In Thorpe v. Pennock Mere. Company, 99 Minn. 22, 
108 N. W. 440, the court said: 
"In fact, as the partnership was insolvent the 
parties may well have reasoned that the interests of 
the creditors would be advanced by the organiza-
tion of the corporation under conditions which would 
render solvent the holders of the stock who were re-
sponsible for partnership debts.'' 
John W. Smith testified that some time earlier in Oc-
tober, 1930, he went t<> D. A. Skeen's office and told him 
about the organization of the corporation and that he 
had reserved stock for the payment of creditors. He said 
that he offered to pay the W. A. Nielson and Bertha 
Skeen claims in that way and D. A. Skeen referred him 
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to Mr. Spence. He made the same proposition to Mr. 
Spence, who, a few days later, notified him that the pro-
posal would be rejected. (Abs. 79, 81, 83.) 
The articles of incorporation show that 2, 799 shares 
were reserved by John W. Smith, as trustee. D. A. Skeen 
testified that he had never heard such a proposal and Ben 
Spence testified that he had met John vV. Smith for the 
first time in court at the trial. ( Abs. 91.) 
On redirect examination, John vV. Smith said that he 
met Spence in 1930 and had seen him a half a dozen 
times since, twice in D. A. Skeen's office and further 
that he had seen him when the sureties qualified on the 
appeal bond. This testimony is corroborated by the order 
with respect to the qualification of the sureties. (Abs. 95, 
96.) 
In answer to appellants' argument of estoppel 
(pleaded in answer of Smith Land Company, Abs. 30), 
the respondents contend; 
(1) That it is "far fetched,'' and 
(2) That there could be no estoppel as against the 
trustee in bankruptcy. (Res. Br., 29.) When an argu-
ment cannot be met, it is convenient to say it is "far 
fetched'' but this bare .statement is no more convincing 
than the argument that there is no basis for estoppel ''as 
applied to the trustee in Bankruptcy.'' Apparently re-
spondents believe that a trustee gets a bright new title to 
all claims and that he enters the picture carrying the halo 
of innocence. This, of course, is not the law. The trustee 
merely steps into the shoes of the creditors and he takes 
the claims subject to all of the infirmities incident to them 
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in the hands of the original creditors. In Remington on 
Bankruptcy, last edition, Section 1509, it is said: 
''It is well established that the effect of 70 e is to 
clothe the trustee with no new or additional rights 
other than those which a creditor would have pos-
sessed but simply puts him in the shoes of a creditor 
as regards a fraudulent transaction subject to the 
same limitations and disabilities that would have be-
set a creditor in the prosecution on his own behalf.'' 
Security Warehouse Company v. Hand, 206 U.S. 
415, 51 L. ed. 1117, 27 S. Ct. 789; 
Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288, 59 L. ed. 
583, 35 S. Ct. 377 ; 
Davis v. Willey, 263 Fed. 588. 
Some startling inconsistencies in respondents' argu-
ment should be notic~d. It is pleaded in the complaint: 
''That upon the entry of said judgment, execu-
tion was issued thereon and delivered to the Sheriff 
of Box Elder County and said executions were duly 
returned by the said Sheriff wholly unsatisfied and 
the said judgments, nor any part thereof, have not 
been paid.'' ( Abs. 2.) 
This, by the way, is omitted from the respondents' 
resume' of the pleadings although the authorities hold 
that to entitle the plaintiff to equitable relief in proceed-
ings of this kind, there must be a showing that execution 
has been issued and returned unsatisfied. It is next con-
tended that the respondents and their attorneys had no 
notice whatever of the return on execution until June, 
1937-(Res. Br. 30) some two years after the complaint 
was filed in which it is alleged that the execution in ques-
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tion was returned unsatisfied. This fancy dodging does 
not carry conviction. If W. A. Nielson didn't know in 
1935 that the execution had been returned unsatisfied in 
1930, he perjured himself when he pleaded that it had 
been returned unsatisfied. Yet, with the return showing 
the fact of the transfer in 1930 in the possession of the 
agent of the plaintiff-the sheriff-the following state-
ment is made in the respondents' brief, page 32: 
''There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record 
to show that the sheriff of Box Elder County ever 
learned that the contract has been assigned to this 
corporation or that Mr. S1nith transferred his prop-
erty.'' 
This is a wishful statement. It is surprising that the 
respondents would make it with the sheriff's return on 
the record dated December 3, 1930, referring to the letter 
of J.D. Skeen received by the sheriff on or about N ovem-
ber 7, 1930, and attached to the return as an exhibit. The 
letter is .set out in full in the abstract, pages 113-114. 
Yet, as stated above, the respondents say there is not a 
scintilla of evidence in the record showing that the sheriff 
ever knew that the contract had been transferred. When 
D. A. Skeen, attorney for respondents, was asked where 
he got the information that the execution was returned 
unsatisfied and was asked whether he got it from the 
sheriff or his deputy, he said, ''I do not recall ever talk-
ing to the sheriff." (Abs. 107.) It will be noticed that 
he did not deny ever talking with or hearing from the 
deputy in 1930 when the return was dated. The rule is 
well settled that notice to an agent is notice to the princi-
10 
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pal regardless of the latter's actual knowledge if the in-
formation was received by the agent within the course of 
his employment and "ithin the scope of his authority. 
2 Mecham on Agency, Sec. 1803, et seq., :2 C. J. 859, and 
numerous cases cited. It is also the law that notice to an 
attorney at law is notice to his client. An additional case 
on the subject of duty of making inquiry has come to the 
writer's attention. It is closely in point and we believe 
clearly states the rule. 
Deering v. Holcomb, 26 Wash. 588, 67 P. 240, 561. 
The uncontradicted evidence shows notice of the trans-
fer to the sheriff, agent of the plaintiff, Bertha Skeen, 
in the case in which the $100.00 judgment was procured 
and under the familiar rules mentioned above, D. A. 
Skeen, her attorney, and W. A. Nielson, his client and 
Bertha Skeen, successor, had notice more than four years 
before suit was instituted. The cause of action, if any 
ever existed is clearly barred by the Statute of Limita-· 
tions. 
The respondents attempt to answer appellants' argu-
ment that the court erred in entering judgment in favor 
of Wheelwright after he had been replaced as a party by 
Turley by court order dated February 4, 1939, by saying 
on page 33 of their brief that : 
"The trustee, however, was not dismissed out of 
the case, but continued through as a party to the 
case and the final judgment was entered according-
ly." 
Apparently the word ''substituted'' which appears three 
times in the order is misunderstood. Counsel must think 
11" 
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that when one person is substituted for another he be-
comes a sort of alternate and the court may at its con-
venience designate either party as judgment creditor. 
This is, of course, absurd and is the usual result of .shift-
ing positions to gain an advantage. Turley was used by 
the respondents as a dummy with the idea of acquiring 
Smith's equity in the property over and above the judg-
ments. They caused him to be substituted for Wheel-
wright because he had bought the lawsuit from Wheel-
wright and succeeded to all of his rights. However, they 
couldn't see any possibility of collecting the $1247.19 
bankruptcy costs (which include some $750.00 attorneys 
fee for D. A. Skeen) through Turley so they switched back 
to Wheelwright and drew a decree in his favor although 
the record is clear that he no longer has any interest in 
the case. Since the assets, if any, of the bankrupt's estate 
were sold to Turley for $500.00, the estate had money to 
pay the expense of bankruptcy. It could be paid out of 
the $500.00. It should be noted that the trial court found 
that all of Smith's right, title and interest in the land 
which he attempted to transfer in fraud of creditors was 
sold to Turley and then the court entered judgment in 
the Box Elder County case in favor of Wheelwright and 
against Smith and the corporation. 
There has been no attempt made to explain how the 
state court can enforce payment of the expenses of the 
bankruptcy court and no explanation is made of the fact 
that the decrees of the trial court are dated April 3, 1939, 
and the order of the bankruptcy court, which respondents 
seek to enforce, is dated April11, 1939. When the decrees 
12 
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were entered, the bankruptcy order was not only not final, 
but it had not even been made! 
In the Salt Lake County case, the court made a decree 
in favor of Wheelwright, who leas nel'er a party, requir-
ing Smith and the Smith Land Company to pay the judg-
ment and also the expenses of bankruptcy. The decree is 
also in favor of John W. Smith, who was never a party, 
requiring specific performance of the contract for his 
benefit. It is interesting to note that the decree is also 
in favor of the "fungus" corporation and provides for 
delivery of a deed to it upon receipt of the $2433.88 which 
was tendered by the Smith Land Company and by no one 
else. The court also found that Turley (also not a party) 
was the owner of the vendee's interest in the contract, 
but nevertheless decreed specific performance to Smith 
and the Smith Land Company. That part of the decree 
which imposes liens upon the land and conditions in favor 
of strangers to the suit is clearly erroneous and must be 
stricken. The decree in the Box Elder County case must 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. D. SKEffiN, 
E. J. SKEEN, 
Atto'rneys for Appellants. 
13 
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